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Much has been said about the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its proposed changes 
since it was installed. The comments focus mainly on 
ﬂ exibility of the rules, how to tackle misbehaviour and 
how to secure a non-partisan implementation of the 
rules.1 Further, there is fear that making the SGP rules 
less strict would mean higher inﬂ ation rates, higher 
interest rates, and a weaker euro.2 What is missing in 
these comments are the possible effects on the Euro-
pean economies of a coordinated ﬁ scal policy. Such 
a policy might result in much smaller national public 
deﬁ cits than might be expected from the non-coordi-
nated expansion of public expenditure. 
The reason for an increase of public expenditure is 
clear. The European economy has been stagnant for 
some time now. In some EU countries there has even 
been talk of a shrinking economy, with all its conse-
quences for job opportunities and government ﬁ -
nances. For many experts, the recipe for recovery is to 
be found in the United States, where the government 
boosts the economy by reducing taxes and increasing 
military spending. Further, the world economy is stim-
ulated by China’s runaway economic growth. Europe 
has too little to set against these examples. If it is to 
speed up recovery, Europe too needs an active ﬁ scal 
policy. In this article we sketch the possible effects of 
such a policy, with the help of an input-output model. 
For a long time, the Dutch government has chosen 
to keep its projected budget deﬁ cit to a minimum by 
means of cuts. There are not too many alternatives 
for a small European country like the Netherlands. 
An anti-cyclical ﬁ scal policy, in which the reduction in 
private investment is balanced by an increase in pub-
lic spending or a reduction in taxes, is not an option 
because the open character of the economy allows a 
large proportion of the beneﬁ ts to ﬂ ow abroad, leading 
ultimately to an increase in the budget deﬁ cit.3 Only a 
concerted effort by all the euro countries together can 
provide relief.
 Since the introduction of the euro, the euro coun-
tries have opted for a number of stabilising measures 
with the aim of limiting inﬂ ation and maintaining the 
value of the euro in relation to other important cur-
rencies like the American dollar. The most signiﬁ cant 
of these is undoubtedly the rule that the government 
budget of all EU countries should be kept in balance. 
We have seen that these stabilisation measures have 
worked so well that the euro has become a strong 
currency. However, one of the effects of this is that 
while import costs of goods from outside Europe have 
gone down, export costs have gone up. A strong euro 
has not, therefore, contributed to economic recovery. 
Furthermore, the stabilisation treaty has made national 
ﬁ scal policy measures (like increased spending budg-
ets and tax reductions) dysfunctional, without replac-
ing them with a coordinated European ﬁ scal policy. We 
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can safely assert that the only remaining form of Euro-
pean macro-economic policy is monetary policy. 
The monetary policy in European countries is de-
cided by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt. 
This institution has within its brief two important and 
interconnected tasks: (1) limiting inﬂ ation, and (2) sta-
bilising the euro. We can conﬁ rm that the European 
Central Bank is successful in these tasks: inﬂ ation is 
low and the euro is a stable currency. In contrast to the 
Federal Reserve Bank the European Central Bank is 
not responsible for economic growth and the related 
development of employment opportunities.4 In Europe 
this is still entirely a matter for national governments, 
whose hands are tied by the stabilisation treaty. It 
would therefore be a good idea to reformulate the role 
of the European Central Bank in line with the American 
model. 
Projected Effects of a 
Dutch Government Budget Increase
The model describes the internal and external trade 
relations of the ﬁ fteen EU countries.5 The economies 
of these countries are interdependent, on account of 
internal trade between them.6 A rise in government 
spending in one country affects not only its own na-
tional economy but also that of other member coun-
tries, due to the “trickle down effect”.7 In a small, open 
economy, such as that of the Netherlands, this is con-
siderable, which means that a stimulating ﬁ scal policy 
launched by the Dutch government alone has little 
impact on the size of the national economy but a big 
impact on the budget deﬁ cit. This is illustrated in Table 
1. A change in government spending of 5% leads to 
a rise in GNP of 2.2%.8 This is in line with a multiplier 
effect of only 1.19 (the change in GNP divided by the 
total amount of the increase of public spending). 
 This would have turned the small ﬁ nancial surplus 
of 2001 into a ﬁ nancial deﬁ cit of almost 1% of the na-
tional income, which is in fact well within the maximum 
permitted deﬁ cit of 3%. 
When drawing comparisons with the countries 
around us, it is striking that Belgium and Ireland, with 
5 The countries that joined on 1 May 2004 are not included. Further-
more, not all EU members at the time, most noteworthy the UK, had 
the euro as their currency. 
6 Internal trade ﬁ gures are from the Eurostat Datashop in Voorburg (the 
Netherlands).
7 A. R. H o e n : An Input-Output Analysis of European Integration, 
Capelle aan den Ijssel 1999, Labyrint Publication.
8 By economic growth, in this article, we mean the increase in GNP 
relative to the GNP of 2001.
Table 1
Effects of a 5% Increase in 
Government Spending in The Netherlands 
Calculated 
public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
20011 
(% of GNP)2
Public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
2001 
(% of GNP)
Change in 
GNP 2001 
(%)
Change in trade 
balance 2001 
after increase in 
public spending 
(% of GNP)
France -1.08 -1.10 0.04 0.017
Netherlands -0.94 0.08 2.21 -1.016
Germany -2.09 -2.11 0.07 0.024
Italy -1.69 -1.70 0.03 0.011
UK 0.78 0.76 0.06 0.022
Ireland 3.38 3.36 0.10 0.024
Denmark 2.24 2.22 0.05 0.022
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.004
Portugal -3.45 -3.47 0.04 0.017
Spain 2.45 2.43 0.04 0.013
Belgium 0.30 0.23 0.19 0.072
Luxembourg 6.75 6.71 0.08 0.038
Sweden 3.76 3.74 0.05 0.024
Finland 3.93 3.91 0.05 0.019
Austria 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.015
1 By public ﬁ nancial result is meant government income minus gov-
ernment expenditure. A minus sign in the ﬁ rst two columns of Tables 
1, 2 and 3 therefore indicates a public deﬁ cit.
2 The GNP amounts are taken from the Eurostat yearbook 2003, The 
statistical guide to Europe, data 1991-2001.
Table 2
Effects of a 5% Increase in 
Government Spending in Germany
 Calculated 
public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
2001
Public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
2001
Change in 
GNP 2001
Change trade 
balance 2001 
after increase  in 
public spending
 (% of GNP) (% of GNP) (%) (% of GNP)
France -1.02 -1.10 0.19 0.077
Netherlands 0.28 0.08 0.54 0.201
Germany -2.78 -2.11 3.11 -0.668
Italy -1.64 -1.70 0.17 0.065
UK 0.81 0.76 0.17 0.056
Ireland 3.44 3.36 0.37 0.088
Denmark 2.34 2.22 0.27 0.116
Greece 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.024
Portugal -3.38 -3.47 0.24 0.091
Spain 2.49 2.43 0.17 0.057
Belgium 0.40 0.23 0.45 0.172
Luxembourg 6.94 6.71 0.52 0.228
Sweden 3.81 3.74 0.17 0.074
Finland 3.99 3.91 0.20 0.078
Austria 0.18 0.00 0.45 0.178
4 F. S. M i s h k i n : The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial 
Markets, Pearson Education 2001.
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their respective economic growth levels of 0.19% and 
0.10%, would stand to gain the most from this. 
Effects of a German 
Government Budget Increase
In this scenario, the country with the highest na-
tional income increases its budget by 5%. It can be 
seen in Table 2 that Germany, with a rise in GNP of 
3%, would beneﬁ t more from its own increase than 
the Netherlands would. Germany’s economy is more 
closed than that of the Netherlands, where increasing 
government spending by 5% would only boost eco-
nomic growth by 2.2%. The multiplier for Germany is 
1.71, compared to 1.19 for the Netherlands. 
The striking difference between these scenarios is 
that while the German budget deﬁ cit would grow by 
0.7% as a result of a budget increase, the Dutch deﬁ -
cit would grow by 1%. This is undoubtedly linked to 
the greater openness of the Dutch economy, and the 
consequent, relatively small, scale of the multiplier. 
In comparison with other countries, where the in-
come would increase by a few tenths of one percent, 
the Netherlands, with a growth of 0.54%, would ben-
eﬁ t the most from the German initiative. Equally, of all 
these countries, the Netherlands suffers more nega-
tive consequences from the current stagnation of the 
German economy. 
Effects of an Increase in Government Spending by 
All EU Member Countries
What would happen if all the EU member states 
increased their government spending by 5%? The 
prediction is that the budget deﬁ cit would not increase 
dramatically. 
In Table 3 we can see the calculated effects of a 
joint spending increase on national income, the budg-
et deﬁ cit and the trade balance of the EU member 
states. GNP would go up by between 3.24% (Ireland) 
and 4.48% (Greece). In no single country would a joint 
initiative boost the economy by more than 5%. The 
reason for this is that demand within the EU would go 
up, while the demand for EU products in the rest of the 
world is assumed to remain constant. Therefore, in-
comes from exports to countries outside the EU would 
not change, which puts a break on economic growth 
in member countries. 
As far as budget deﬁ cits are concerned, the follow-
ing points are noteworthy. In comparison with 2001, 
deﬁ cits would go up and surpluses would go down, 
although by smaller amounts than those that would 
result from unilateral spending increases by individual 
governments. For the Netherlands for example, a uni-
lateral increase would create a deﬁ cit of 0.94%, while 
a joint one would create a deﬁ cit of only 0.29%. In 
Germany, the ﬁ gures are 2.78% for a unilateral in-
crease and 2.49% for a joint one. 
A joint increase in spending would worsen the trade 
balance in all the member states. The degree to which 
this would happen would depend on the level of the 
marginal import quota. The projected increase in the 
trade balance deﬁ cit after a joint spending increase 
ranges from 0.23% (Spain) to 0.46% (Sweden) of the 
GNP. This is because exports to countries outside the 
EU are assumed to be constant, while imports from 
these countries depend on the incomes of the mem-
ber states. In this case, economic growth throughout 
the EU would automatically worsen the trade balance 
of member countries. 
In Table 4, the multipliers and the economic growth 
of EU countries are compared.
The multiplier shows the rate of increase in income 
per extra euro spent. This clearly differs per country. A 
country with a fairly open economy has a low multiplier 
if it implements a policy of stimulation. A country with 
a relatively closed economy, on the other hand, has a 
high multiplier. The size of a country’s multiplier in a 
joint policy of stimulation depends on trade relations 
Table 3
Effects of a 5% Increase in Government Spending 
by all EU Member States at once
 Calculated 
public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
2001
Public ﬁ nan-
cial result 
2001
Change in 
GNP 2001 
Change in trade 
balance 2001 
after increase in 
public spending 
 (% of GNP) (% of GNP) (%) (% of GNP)
France -1.42 -1.10 4.19 -0.321
Netherlands -0.29 0.08 3.96 -0.373
Germany -2.49 -2.11 3.93 -0.377
Italy -2.02 -1.70 4.12 -0.317
UK 0.47 0.76 4.12 -0.287
Ireland 2.95 3.36 3.24 -0.410
Denmark 1.86 2.22 4.12 -0.365
Greece -0.19 0.00 4.48 -0.191
Portugal -3.67 -3.47 4.44 -0.205
Spain 2.21 2.43 4.31 -0.225
Belgium -0.21 0.23 3.78 -0.446
Luxembourg 6.35 6.71 4.14 -0.366
Sweden 3.28 3.74 3.92 -0.456
Finland 3.47 3.91 3.81 -0.441
Austria -0.41 0.00 3.95 -0.405
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 Multiplier for 
countries 
separately 
Multiplier 
for a joint 
policy
Growth of 
GNP for a uni-
lateral policy 
Growth of 
GNP for a 
joint policy 
 (%) (%)
France 1.67 2.03 3.45 4.19
Netherlands 1.19 2.13 2.22 3.96
Germany 1.71 2.15 3.11 3.93
Italy 1.83 2.20 3.44 4.12
UK 2.03 2.42 3.45 4.12
Ireland 1.21 2.70 1.46 3.24
Denmark 1.47 1.92 3.15 4.12
Greece 2.21 2.34 4.22 4.48
Portugal 1.77 2.32 3.39 4.44
Spain 1.97 2.53 3.37 4.31
Belgium 0.99 2.00 1.88 3.78
Luxembourg 1.00 1.86 2.23 4.14
Sweden 1.42 1.79 3.11 3.92
Finland 1.52 1.98 2.92 3.81
Austria 1.47 1.97 2.93 3.95
Table 4
Multiplier Effect and Income Growth
with other EU member states. Ireland, for instance, 
has a fairly low multiplier (1.21) in a unilateral increase 
in government spending, whereas its intensive trade 
relations with other EU states lead to a very high mul-
tiplier (2.70) in the scenario of a joint increase. The 
Netherlands has quite an open economy (an individual 
multiplier of 1.19), but because a high proportion of its 
exports go outside the EU, the multiplier in the sce-
nario of a joint EU stimulation policy is lower than that 
of Ireland (2.13). 
In terms of economic growth, Ireland would ben-
eﬁ t least from either the unilateral increase or the joint 
EU-wide increase. This shows that a high multiplier 
does not always mean a high economic growth rate. 
Since the increase is represented by a percentage of 
overall government spending, a relatively small gov-
ernment sector would entail a small increase, which 
in turn would limit the impact of the increase on the 
economy. 
Discussion and Conclusion
The input-output model has, of course, its limita-
tions and these include a lack of attention to dynamic 
or supply-driven factors. Further, it is well known that 
a Keynesian spending policy has a shortterm effect 
only. To restore the European economy in the long run 
a number of painful measures will have to be taken in 
other areas of the economy. For example, the labour 
market is in great need of reform in order to make it 
more ﬂ exible. However, to make that work an impulse 
on the demand side of the economy will certainly con-
tribute to the success of the proposed restructuring 
of the labour market. With a view to the reservations 
made, the results of the model calculations should be 
treated with a certain amount of caution. 
However, what is more important is the philosophy 
behind the model. Because there is no question of a 
common ﬁ scal policy in the EU, each EU country faces 
a “prisoner’s dilemma”, whereby it seems to be in 
each country’s interests not to stimulate the economy, 
with the net result of a less than optimal European 
economic situation characterised by low economic 
growth and rising unemployment. The results of the 
model calculations show that a joint ﬁ scal policy could 
really provide part of the solution to the current eco-
nomic malaise. 
The current economic situation in Europe is not very 
hopeful. The objectives of the European Central Bank 
are being reached, but this does not seem to be the 
key issue at the moment. It is much more important 
to stimulate job creation in Europe. Unfortunately, the 
dominance of monetary aims, the attendant (reformed) 
stabilisation pact and the absence of a coordinated 
ﬁ scal policy mean that the euro countries do not have 
the option of the kind of anti-cyclical budget policy 
that is implemented in the USA by means of planned 
tax reductions and increased government spending. 
Not even the largest member states, France and 
Germany, would be able to revive the European 
economy single-handedly. Both the European and 
the global economy have thus become dependent on 
economic growth in the USA and in emerging econo-
mies such as China and India. If this is insufﬁ cient, the 
feeble growth of the European economy will turn into a 
recession, bringing rising unemployment in its wake. 
It is therefore imperative that, together with 
supplyside measures, the euro countries develop a 
coordinated ﬁ scal policy. If the European and global 
economy is to be stimulated, European governments 
must jointly implement a shrewd package of stimula-
tion measures, geared not only to spending effects 
– important as these may be – but also to the long-
term effects on, for example, the European knowledge 
economy. Like this, it cuts both ways. A joint initiative 
can limit the consequences for the national budget, 
even to the extent that the current stability require-
ments can be met.
